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Casenote
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL FOR
DRUNK DRIVERS. Pickard v. Director of Motor Vehicles,
184 Neb. 13, 165 N.W.2d 96, motion for rehearing overruled,
184 Neb. 573, 169 N.W.2d 460 (1969).
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the landmark decisions of Miranda v. Arizona1 and Esco-
bedo v. Illinois,2 state and federal courts have struggled to set the
boundaries on further interpretation of one's constitutional rights
in areas other than the criminal law. For example, those states
which have enacted implied consent laws have been consistently
confronted with the assertion of these constitutional arguments by
those convicted of driving while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor. By and large the courts sitting in implied consent states have
remained impervious to the general trend generated by Miranda
and Escobedo by narrowly construing the rights of those individuals
accused of driving while under the influence.
Recently, several states have for the first time dealt with the
issue of whether an accused suspected of driving under the influence
should be afforded consultation with or have access to counsel as
a condition precedent to taking a blood, breath or urine test. The
vast majority of states have refused to allow the right to counsel
in these cases.
Since Finocchairo v. Kelly was decided in 1962, most courts
interpreting implied consent laws have held that one accused of
driving while under the influence cannot successfully complain that
his constitutional rights were infringed because he was denied ac-
cess to counsel. Four years later, the United States Supreme Court
in Schmerber v. California4 affirmed the criminal conviction of an
individual subject to the California implied consent law. The
Schmerber case rejected the appellant's arguments based on the
fourth, fifth and sixth amendments.
1 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
3 11 N.Y.2d 58, 181 N.E.2d 427, 226 N.Y.S.2d 403, cert. denied, 370 U.S.
912 (1962).
4 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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At least two state jurisdictions, Nebraska 5 and New York,6 have
departed from the general principles set forth in Schmerber and
Finocchairo by allowing counsel, in certain circumstances, to one
accused of driving while under the influence. The Nebraska Su-
preme Court has limited the right to counsel only where the appro-
priate factual context was present at the time of arrest. The New
York Court of Appeals has held that one accused of driving while
under the influence should be permitted access to counsel under
particular circumstances.
The government in general and the courts in particular have
become increasingly aware of the large number of deaths and injur-
ies both to property and persons caused by the drinking driver.
Recent studies conducted on both the state and federal level have
revealed that a disproportionately small number of drinking drivers
are involved in over half the fatal accidents.7 These factors have
been influential in restricting the expansion of constitutional rights
to drinking drivers in order to minimize the peculiar threat to
public safety. Consequently, the power of law enforcement agencies
has remained relatively unencumbered by constitutional restric-
tions when enforcing the implied consent law.
5 Pickard v. Director of Motor Vehicles, 184 Neb. 13, 165 N.W.2d 96,
motion for rehearing overruled, 184 Neb. 573, 169 N.W.2d 460 (1969).
6 People v. Gursey, 22 N.Y.2d 224, 239 N.E.2d 351, 292 N.Y.S.2d 416
(1968).
7 An interview on August 14, 1969 with Tom Ryan, Chief of Accident
Records for the state of Nebraska produced the following facts: There
were approximately 900,000 licensed motor vehicles and operators in
Nebraska during 1968. In that year there were over 40,000 automobile
accidents with 452 deaths and 18,478 personal injuries. Significantly,
out of the 452 recorded highway fatalities in 1968, 90 were reported
to have involved drinking drivers. For additional information con-
cerning the drunk driver see, The Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 29,
1969, at 5, col. 1. The Monitor article reported the results from a recent
study compiled by the Indiana State Police Department which looked
into the causes of fatal traffic accidents. The Indiana study, "Analogue
1000," produced similar findings to those reported in other states. It
was based on 1,238 fatalities in 1,000 fatal traffic accidents occurring
between 1965 and 1967. The following conclusions were formulated
from "Analogue 1000:"
1) More than fifty percent of those killed in a traffic accident had been
in a collision involving a drunk driver.
2) Fifty percent of the drunk drivers had blood-alcohol levels ex-
ceeding the legal minimum.
3) The 30 to 45 age group was the most susceptible to a fatal accident
after drinking.
4) That very few of the drunk drivers had previous incidents of
arrest or accidents before their fatal collision.
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The practical effect of the implied consent law is to compel
the accused either to submit to one of several chemical tests or
face possible revocation of his driver's license. The accused must
determine his course of action in a short span of time. It is at this
point that decision making by the accused drunk driver becomes
critical in relationship to future sanctions imposed by the implied
consent law. If the accused refuses to submit to a chemical test
he becomes subject to both civil and criminal sanctions. However,
if the accused consents to a chemical test the possibility of civil
sanction is immediately terminated.
Initially, this comment will attempt to determine the effect of
Pickard v. Director of Motor Vehicles" on the general course charted
by prior Nebraska cases. Secondly, the language contained in the
Pickard dictum will be examined and compared to decisions from
other states operating under an implied consent law. The following
topics will be used for the comparison: (1) The operation of an
appropriate factual context; (2) The operation of the civil and
criminal proceedings; (3) The operation of the critical stage argu-
ment; and (4) The operation of the Miranda warnings.
Pickard involved an appeal challenging the validity of a revoca-
tion order issued by the Director of Motor Vehicles suspending the
appellant's drivers license for a period of one year. The facts indi-
cated the appellant had been arrested in March, 1966, for driving
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. According to testi-
mony given by the arresting officer, Pickard was placed under
arrest at approximately 4:30 P.m. At the station house the arresting
officer read the implied consent rules to the appellant and then
requested the appellant to submit to a chemical test. The officer
testified that the accused refused to submit to the test. Subse-
quently, the officer began to interrogate the appellant at which
time, according to the officer's version, the appellant requested a
lawyer. The officer then permitted Pickard access to a telephone,
but he was unable to contact his lawyer.
The testimony given by appellant and his passenger, Lally, con-
flicted with that given by the officer on several important facts.
First, appellant testified that the arrest was made at 5:00 P.m. rather
than 4:30. Appellant did not refuse to submit to a chemical test
but only asked to talk with a lawyer. Later, when a lawyer was
..contacted and arrived at the station, the appellant was not again
.asked to submit to a chemical test.
8 184 Neb. 13, 165 N.W.2d 96, motion for rehearing overruled, 184 Neb.
573, 169 N.W.2d 460 (1969).
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Justice McCown, writing for the majority, affirmed the revoca-
tion order. However, the opinion did not stop at affirming the revo-
cation order but went on to establish a test providing the right to
counsel in certain circumstances.
In an appropriate factual context, a request for a brief delay in
making the decision to accept or refuse the chemical test in order to
consult with a lawyer should be granted where the delay is short
and does not jeopardize the effectiveness of the test.... The taking
of a chemical test authorized by the Implied Consent Law is not
ordinarily required to be delayed by a request of the arrested
motorist that he be permitted to contact legal counsel.9
Chief Justice White in a dissenting opinion, attacked the rule
set forth by the majority, stating: "[We] are faced with a situation
that will result in emasculation of the enforcement of the statute
[Implied Consent Law]. '"1° Furthermore, the Chief Justice forecast
that its operation would "effectively prevent the disciplining and
control of the borderline drinking driver" '11 because the burden has
been unnecessarily placed upon the state and the arresting officer.
In a separate dissent, Justice Carter articulated the fear that
such a test would place an undue burden on the arresting officer
and that the test "induces confusion as to the law in a case where
the law is clear.' 12
Pickard has departed from the traditional policy enunciated by
the court in Prucha v. Department of Motor Vehicles,8 which
held: "The language of the statute is clear and there is nothing
on its face that requires the police officer to go any further than
9 Id. at 574, 169 N.W.2d at 460.
10 Id. at 579, 169 N.W.2d at 463.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 580, 169 N.W.2d at 463.
13 172 Neb. 415, 110 N.W.2d 75 (1961). See State v. Dubany, 184 Neb. 337,
341-42, 167 N.W.2d 556, 559 (1969), where the defendant was convicted
of unlawfully operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of
alcoholic liquor, and appealed. Evidence indicated the defendant was
not advised of his constitutional rights prior to questioning at the
scene of arrest by the arresting officer. During this questioning the
accused admitted drinking. His admission was introduced into evidence
at the trial. However, the court dismissed the defendant's contention
that his rights had been violated by stating: "The only statement of
defendant mentioned by the patrolman in his testimony was de-
fendant's answer of 'Yes' to the inquiry as to whether he had been
drinking. This inquiry was made when defendant was still in his
own truck, not in custody, and while he was under no coercion. In
on-the-scene investigations the police may interview any person not
in custody and not subject to coercion for the purpose of determining
whether a crime has been committed and who committed it."
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request the motorist to submit to the test."'14 Obviously, when
the mandate in Pickard is used, the arresting officer must make
more than a mere request when one accused of driving while under
the influence asks for a lawyer. The court in Prucha resolved a
different constitutional issue, to wit: whether the taking of blood
under the implied consent law violated the fifth amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination. In response to the fifth amendment
argument the court stated: "A license is a privilege and does not
create property in any legal or constitutional sense. By the act of
driving his car, he has waived his constitutional privilege of self-
incrimination, which has always been considered to be a privilege
of a solely personal nature which may be waived."'15
Pickard and Prucha take inconsistent approaches in making con-
stitutional rights available to those who are accused of driving
while under the influence of alcohol. Ironically, the court permits
the sixth amendment arguments in the appropriate factual con-
text, but totally denies the application of the fifth amendment in
all circumstances.
Traditionally, the fundamental rights guaranteed by the fourth,
fifth and sixth amendments have been applied with an equal hand
to redress injustices. However, Pickard and Prucha have resulted
in an unequal application of this traditional principle by allowing
the right to counsel in certain limited circumstances while at the
same time effectively eliminating the defense of self-incrimination
in all cases. This artificial distinction is at odds with the basic con-
cepts behind Anglo-American justice.
The policy enunciated in Prucha was followed by the court
in Ziemba v. Johns.16 In Ziemba, the court decided that a plea
of guilty to a criminal charge of drunk driving does not satisfy the
reasonableness test by one who refused to submit to a chemical
test. The court rejected the argument that a plea of guilty to the
criminal charge of driving under the influence ought to obviate
the civil proceedings, the rationale behind this rejection being:
"Each action proceeds independently of the other and the outcome
of one action is of no consequence to the other."'1 7
On rehearing the court in Pickard did not give much atten-
tion to the equal protection argument which was raised in Ziemba.
14 172 Neb. at 420, 110 N.W.2d at 80.
'5 Id. at 423-24, 110 N.W.2d at 82.16 183 Neb. 644, 163 N.W.2d 780 (1968).
17 Id. at 646, 163 N.W.2d at 781. For a discussion of the decision in
Ziemba, see Nebraska Supreme Court Review, 48 NEB. L. REv. 985,
1039 (1969).
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Perhaps one reason is the inability of the court to reconcile the
language of Ziemba with the rule allowing the right to counsel
in certain cases. It is important to recognize that Ziemba focused
on the legitimacy or validity of independently conducted proceed-
ings to produce results that would bind each other. However, the
Pickard decision focused on the choice made by the accused at the
time of arrest. His choice would determine the number of proceed-
ings to which he would be subject.
In State v. Amick' s the court held that one accused of drunk
driving does not have the right to a jury trial. Amick, in rejecting
this right, stated "that the offense charged in the instant case
[drunk driving] is outside of the purview of the cited provision of
the Constitution [Nebraska Constitution article one, section six,
which provides the right of trial by jury]."'19
These early Nebraska decisions of Prucha, Ziemba, and Amick
clearly exemplified a restrictive interpretation of the constitutional
rights guaranteed to one accused of driving while under the influ-
ence of alcohol. Furthermore, these cases construed together, dem-
onstrate a definite policy decision to subordinate the constitutional
rights of the accused to the public welfare. Clearly, Pickard does not
follow the restrictive approach of earlier cases but until the courts
provide additional clarification, it will be impossible to determine
the extent and nature of the change contemplated by the court.
Before turning to those states which have reached results oppo-
site from Pickard, it should be noted that Nebraska was not the
first jurisdiction to permit counsel to one accused of driving under
the influence. In People v. Gursey,2 0 the New York Court of Appeals
followed the concurring opinion in Finocchairo to permit the ex-
tension of counsel to those accused of driving under the influence.
In Gursey the accused was told after his arrest that he could call
an attorney after he gave certain information. After cooperating
with the arresting officer, the accused renewed his request for coun-
sel, but it was refused. When the appellant refused to submit to a
drunkometer test, another officer told the accused that failure to
submit would mean losing his drivers license. It was only after
this threat that the accused reluctantly consented to submit. The
evidence from the test was later admitted at the trial and ulti-
mately convicted him of the criminal charge of drunken driving.
The supreme court reversed the criminal conviction and the court
of appeals in affirming that decision held:
Is 173 Neb. 770, 114 N.W.2d 893 (1962).
19 Id. at 772, 114 N.W.2d at 894.
20 22 N.Y.2d 224, 239 N.E.2d 351, 292 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1968).
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Granting defendant's requests would not have substantially inter-
fered with the investigative procedure, since the telephone call
would have been concluded in a matter of minutes .... Conse-
quently, the denial of defendant's requests for an opportunity to
telephone his lawyer must be deemed to have violated his privilege
of access to counsel.2 1
However, the holding in Gursey is distinguishable from the Pick-
ard dictum in several significant respects. First, the New York court
established a definite precedent in Gursey, but the dictum in Pick-
ard does not necessarily bind future decisions. Also, there are no
limiting factors such as "appropriate factual context" or a require-
ment of a felonious crime on the application of the New York rule;
rather, the case applies the right to counsel equally. In addition,
Gursey provides a definitive rule, thereby eliminating the confusion
involved in the Pickard test. Gursey stated that one accused of driv-
ing while under the influence should be afforded access to counsel,
but "[ilf the lawyer is not physically present and cannot be reached
promptly by telephone or otherwise, the defendant may be required
to elect between taking the test and submitting to revocation of his
license, without the aid of counsel. '22
In operation the New York approach will allow counsel in all
cases if the accused can promptly contact his lawyer. Therefore, the
only burden placed on the arresting officer is the determination of
whether there is undelayed access to a telephone or whether the
lawyer is present. The decision in Gursey placed the emphasis upon
the accused's right of access to an attorney rather than the right
to consult with an attorney as evident in Pickard.
II. THE DETERMINATION OF THE
APPROPRIATE FACTUAL CONTEXT
The portion of the Pickard rule that causes the most confusion
is the court's meaning of "appropriate factual context." Its determi-
nation is dependent on two related issues: first, whether complying
with the accused's request means only a brief delay and second,
whether the accused has been involved in a felonious offense.
The basic criticism surrounding the appropriate factual context
test is the obvious omission of concrete guidelines. The rule does
not establish an easily understandable method for law enforcement
officials to determine whether to comply with a request from one
accused of driving under the influence to contact a lawyer. There-
21 Id. at 228, 239 N.E.2d at 353, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 419.
22 Id. at 229, 239 N.E.2d at 353, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 419. But see People v.
Sweeney, 55 Misc. 2d 793, 286 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1968) and People v.
Gielarowski, 58 Misc. 2d 832, 296 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1968).
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fore, the arresting officer is left with his own subjective assessment
which in turn will breed uncertainty in the enforcement of the
rule. In addition, serious consideration should be directed to the
interpretation the accused will place on the phrase. The vagueness
of the phrase lends itself to potential misunderstanding as to its
application in a particular case. Furthermore, the accused may have
been furnished with an offensive weapon, not only to hinder and
confuse the arresting officer, but to consume valuable time that
could affect the efficacy of a subsequent blood test.
The Pickard court conditioned the phrase "appropriate factual
context" by inserting the requirement that any delay in administer-
ing be brief. While the Pickard court gave recognition to the lan-
guage used in Schmerber, that alcohol dissipates from the blood
stream at a rapid rate once the liquor intake has stopped, it did not
state the time limits in objective terms. Therefore, the determina-
tion of "brief delay" has been left to case by case adjudication.
The Supreme Court of South Dakota, in Blow v. Commissioner
of Motor Vehicles,2 recognized the adverse impact of permitting
delays in blood tests upon the enforcement of the drunk driving
laws, and held that one accused of driving while under the influence
had no constitutional right to counsel when requested to submit to
a blood test. In addition, California cases have acknowledged delays
of one hour 24 as well as forty and thirty-five minutes25 to be grounds
for subsequent suspension when the delay was caused by a request
for counsel.
In Pickard, the actual length of delay was disputed. The delay
at most was less than one hour from the time the appellant made
his request until a lawyer arrived at the police station. Neverthe-
less, Pickard's license was revoked and that revocation was affirmed,
presumably because there was not an appropriate factual context
at the time of arrest for making the request. Therefore, it is uncer-
tain whether a similar delay of one hour or less would be a brief
delay when an appropriate factual context arose.
Theoretically, the arresting officer could circumvent the rule by
later testifying that compliance with the accused's request would
have caused an extended delay. For example, law enforcement
officers located in the western part of the state could typically be
faced with an extended delay if required to supply the accused a
lawyer. In many cases the distance between towns may be miles
23 83 S.D. 628, 164 N.W.2d 351 (1969).
24 Ent v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 265 Cal. App. 2d 936, 71 Cal.
Rptr. 726 (1968).
25 Zidell v. Bright, 264 Cal. App. 2d 867, 71 Cal. Rptr. 111 (1968).
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from the scene of arrest and the attempt to return to town would
consume valuable time. Presumably, the delay of returning to town
before the test is given may be unnecessary if a breathometer test
can be administered at the location of the arrest.
The arresting officer, in addition to ascertaining whether to allow
the accused to consult with a lawyer, which will cause a substantial
delay, must determine if a felony has been committed. Pickard, on
rehearing, elaborated the circumstances when one accused of driv-
ing under the influence should be allowed counsel. The court con-
cluded that counsel should be available only if a felony offense has
been committed in connection with driving under the influence.
Justice McCown, on rehearing, cited the possibility of the accused
being involved in a fatal accident and as a result being subject to
the charge of motor vehicle homicide. Also, the accused may be sub-
ject to the statutory felony charge arising out of a third offense
drunk driving charge.
Schmerber was distinguished on the basis that the accused was
appealing a conviction of a misdemeanor and therefore, even under
later cases was not entitled to a lawyer. Pickard dismissed the
apparent incongruity with Schmerber by commenting that: "The
distinctions between that case and a 'serious criminal case' in Ne-
braska are obvious .... -26
Recently, several California decisions have reached different
results concerning the problem of right to counsel for the accused
drunk driver who is also suspected of a related felony. In People
v. Fite27 the defendant was found guilty of felony drunk driving.
The facts showed that after the accident the defendant and several
other individuals suffered personal injury. At this point the defend-
ant was requested to take a blood alcohol test, but he refused. Sub-
sequent to his refusal, the blood alcohol test was administered with-
out the defendant's consent. At the trial these test results, showing
.21 alcoholic content, were admitted into evidence over the objection
of the defendant. The court did not distinguish between a felony as
compared to the misdemeanor drunk driving case, thereby denying
the accused the right to counsel in each case. Instead, the opinion
construed the California implied consent law in the following
language:
[A] suspected drunk driver has no right to resist or refuse a test
and, if the requirements established by Schmerber are met, the
results of a blood test taken without a person's consent constitute
admissible evidence in a prosecution .... 28
26 184 Neb. 573, 576, 169 N.W.2d 461 (1969).
27 267 Cal. App. 2d 685, 73 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1968).
28 Id. at 690, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 670.
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In another California case, People v. Wren,29 the court of appeals
reaffirmed the earlier decision of Fite. In Wren the court rejected
the defendant's contention that "nonconcensual withdrawal of a
blood sample deprived him of certain statutory rights and also of
his constitutional rights."3 0
Obviously, the Schmerber court did not conclusively settle the
issue of right to counsel for those accused of driving under the influ-
ence. Pickard concluded that Schmerber's holding was limited to
misdemeanor cases while Fite and Wren have expanded the dic-
tates of Schmerber to both felony and misdemeanor cases in Cali-
fornia. In addition, under the Gursey case even those accused of the
misdemeanor of drunk driving are afforded access to counsel. The
defect present in the Nebraska opinion is that it attempts to dis-
tinguish between the misdemeanor and felony offense prior to the
time when charges will be brought against the accused. The determ-
ination of whether one accused of driving under the influence has
sustained two prior convictions is not apparent at the time of
arrest. Therefore, in the majority of cases it will not be obvious
to the arresting officer that the man he is arresting for driving under
the influence will be subject to a felony.
III. CRIMINAL AND CIVIL SANCTIONS
In Ziemba v. Johns,31 the Nebraska Supreme Court emphasized
that the civil and criminal proceedings operated separately and
independently of one another. Therefore, the conviction or acquittal
of the criminal charge of drunk driving does not stop the Director
of Motor Vehicles from initiating a revocation proceeding. Pickard
should have no adverse effect on the decision of the Director of
Motor Vehicles to institute proceedings to revoke the operating
privileges of a driver who unreasonably refuses to submit to a
chemical test. Because the criminal proceedings for drunk driving
operate separately and apart from any civil proceedings, the accused
cannot successfully contend that by reason of denial of counsel he
should have a defense in both proceedings. Since the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel is applicable only in criminal cases, the ac-
cused does not receive any carry-over effect in a civil proceeding.
As a consequence, one accused of driving while under the influence
may be able to demonstrate an appropriate factual context. How-
ever, those facts could prove irrelevant in determining an unrea-
sonable refusal in a civil action.
29 271 A.C.A. 897, 76 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1969).
30 Id. at - - -, 76 Cal. Rptr, at 675.
31 183 Neb. 644, 163 N.W.2d 780 (1968).
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The California cases have also faced the problem of rationalizing
the operation of two systems, civil and criminal; however, in doing
so they have reached a different conclusion than Pickard. The appel-
lant in Finley v. Orr32 was informed of his right to remain silent
and of his right to counsel incident to his arrest for driving while
under the influence. After the arresting officer informed the accused
of those rights, the accused immediately requested the presence of
counsel. The police denied the accused's request and asked him to
submit to a blood test. However, the accused refused the request.
Later the appellant lost his drivers license through revocation by
the Director of Motor Vehicles. The Finley court rejected appel-
lant's contention that was patterned on the holdings in Escobedo
and Miranda and held:
[Sluspects have no constitutional right to refuse a breathalyzer
test 'whether or not counsel is present' . . . . In civil proceedings
concerning the suspension of a person's driving privilege, it has
been held [in other states] that such person does not have a right to
counsel when he is requested to submit to a required test.33
Two other California cases indicate a rejection of the conten-
tion that right to counsel has been violated when the accused is
appealing from a civil revocation. Clearly, under California law, a
demand, by one accused of driving under the influence, for counsel
as a condition precedent to taking a blood test will not preclude
a later civil proceeding instigated by the Director of Motor Vehicles
to suspend the accused's drivers license. In Zidell v. Bright,34 a court
of appeals affirmed the revocation order issued by the Director of
Motor Vehicles. In Zidell the appellant contended the thirty to
forty-five minute delay between his telephone conversation with
his lawyer and his ultimate consent to submit was not an unreason-
able refusal. However, during the time used by the accused, the
arresting officer had returned to his duty. Later when the officer
was notified that the accused had changed his mind and would
submit to the blood test, the arresting officer refused to return to
the station house.
After considering the actions of the appellant and the arresting
officer the court held:
It would be inconsistent with the purpose of the statute to hold that
either Officer Ruddick [the arresting officer], or the officers on duty
at the police station, were required to turn aside from their other
responsibilities and arrange for administration of a belated test
when once appellant had refused to submit after fair warning of
the consequences.3 5
32 262 Cal. App. 2d 656, 69 Cal. Rptr. 137 (1968).
33 Id. at 664, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 141-42 (citations omitted).
34 264 Cal. App. 2d 867, 71 Cal. Rptr. 111 (1968).
35 Id. at 870, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 113 (1968).
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In Westmoreland v. Chapman, 6 the accused was observed by
the arresting officer to be "weaving, and crossed the center"3 7 and,
when stopped, exhibited red eyes, slurred speech, and inability to
stand on his own. After he was advised of his constitutional right
to counsel and right to remain silent, the accused was requested to
submit to a blood test. At that point, the accused requested the
advice of a lawyer. The Westmoreland court discussed the implica-
tions raised by the appellant's right to counsel contention in regard
to the later civil proceedings brought against him. The court held:
It is now settled that in a civil proceeding for suspension of a
person's driving privilege under the California Implied Consent
Law, a driver does not enjoy the right to-consult with counsel, or
to have counsel present, before deciding to submit to the chemical
tests prescribed by the statute inasmuch as such tests do not violate
one's right against self-incrimination. 8
The Iowa Supreme Court in Gottschalk v. Sueppel, 9 decided a
case involving similar allegations as were adjudicated in Nebraska,
California, South Dakota, and Virginia. In Gottschalk the appellant
alleged his constitutional right to counsel under the sixth amend-
ment had been infringed because he was denied the right to counsel
before deciding whether to submit to a blood test. The court specifi-
cally placed a limitation on their holding by stating: "[W]e are not
concerned with what evidence would be admissible if plaintiff were
on trial for [drunken driving]. '40 In respect to those appeals from
civil proceedings the court held:
There is no merit to plaintiffs contention he was deprived of due
process of law by not having an opportunity to confer with his
attorney before electing to consent to a chemical test or to refuse.
... No authority is cited which supports the view plaintiff was
denied due process of law by not having opportunity to confer with
his attorney before the attorney came to the jail to see his client.41
In a later case the Iowa Supreme Court rejected the contention,
sub silentio, that counsel should be afforded in an appeal from a
criminal conviction for drunk driving. In State v. Holt,42 the accused
had been convicted in a criminal action for drunk driving. The main
question on appeal was whether there had been a violation of the
fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. The court's hold-
36 268 Cal. App. 2d 1, 74 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1968).
37 Id. at 3, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
38 Id. at 4, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 365 (citations omitted).
39 258 Iowa 1173, 140 N.W.2d 866 (1966).
40 Id. at 1180, 140 N.W.2d at 870.
41 Id. at 1180-82, 140 N.W.2d at 870-71.
42 - - - Iowa - - -, 156 N.W.2d 884 (1968).
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ing in Holt is sufficiently broad to cover future allegations involving
violation of sixth or fourth amendment rights. The Iowa Supreme
Court held:
There is no absolute right to drive on the highway under any
and all conditions. It is a privilege, not a right .... No one has to
accept the conditions imposed and thus make himself subject
thereto. No one is required to have a driver's license except as a
precedent to driving.... We know of no reason why a person...
may not waive such 'rights' as he might otherwise have.43
In the most recent reported decision involving the operation
of the civil and criminal proceedings, the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia, in Deaner v. Commonwealth," followed the Cali-
fornia decisions. In Deaner the defendant was arrested at approxi-
mately 1:30 A.M. and was charged with driving while under the in-
fluence. The arresting officer advised the accused that under the im-
plied consent law he had impliedly consented to submit to a blood
test and refusal to comply would be grounds for revocation of his
drivers license. The evidence indicated the accused did not refuse
to submit to the blood test; instead he only wanted to consult a
lawyer before deciding. However, because of delays at the magis-
trate's office the accused was not able to contact his lawyer before
the two hour period in which the test had to be given according to
the statute. The court in rejecting the allegation that no unreason-
able refusal was made relied on the earlier precedents set forth in
Blow, Finocchiaro, Gottschalk and Finley. The rationale for follow-
ing these earlier cases was stated in the following passage:
The practical effect of this would be that a decision to refuse the
test would not be based upon 'reasonableness,' as contemplated
by the Implied Consent Law, but whether, in the judgment of the
attorney, the refusing of the test would best serve the interest of
his client in a trial of the criminal charge of drunk driving.4 5
Furthermore, the court seemingly settled the issue of how the
chemical test of either blood, urine or breath correlated with the
scheme of both criminal and civil proceedings. Deaner held "that
the blood test prescribed is a part of a civil and administrative pro-
ceeding and that Deaner had no right to condition his taking the
test upon his ability first to consult with counsel."46
In summary, the Pickard court left unanswered the effect of
their ruling on subsequent civil proceedings in their attempt to
formulate a guideline involving criminal sanctions. In contrast the
43 Id. at - - -, 156 N.W.2d at 887.
44 --- Va. - - -, 170 S.E.2d 199 (1969).
45 Id. at - - -, 170 S.E.2d at 204.
46 Id. at - - -, 170 S.E.2d at 204.
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majority of jurisdictions have avoided the omission in Pickard by
adopting one of two theories. One approach is the waiver rationale
which employs the fiction that driving under an implied consent
law impliedly waives otherwise enforceable constitutional rights.
Another approach developed by the Virginia court in Deaner dis-
allows the right to counsel based on the rationale that the blood
test is part of the civil rather than the criminal proceeding.
IV. THE CRITICAL STAGE ARGUMENT
The use and application of the critical stage argument to reach
the rule established in Pickard deserves special comment. In es-
sence the entire philosophy behind the Pickard decision is contin-
gent upon the conclusion that when one accused of driving under
the influence is asked to submit to a chemical test this becomes a
critical stage in the proceedings. However, at least one jurisdiction
has reached a contrary result. In Ent v. Department of Motor Ve-
hicles,47 a California court of appeals held the stage of decision mak-
ing by the accused was not a critical stage in the proceedings. Ent
overruled the superior court decision to set aside the suspension
of the respondent's drivers license. The facts indicated that the re-
spondent, a practicing attorney, was arrested for driving under the
influence. When the arresting officer requested that she submit to a
chemical test, she replied that she refused to take any test without
her attorney present. The superior court held the respondent's
reply to the officer's request was not a refusal, but merely a delay
until counsel could arrive. However, the court of appeals disagreed
and quoted the following passage from Finley:
In civil proceedings concerning the suspension of a person's driving
privilege, it has been held, in other states which have implied
consent laws.., that such person does not have a right to counsel
when he is requested to submit to a required test.4 8
While Finley dealt with appellant's contention concerning the right
to counsel in deciding whether to take the test, it did not deal with
the right to counsel with respect to choosing which test to take. The
court in Ent was not persuaded to adopt the distinction between
deciding to take the test and deciding which test to take as was
urged by the respondent. Schmerber was indirectly quoted in sup-
port of this statement:
47 265 Cal. App. 2d 936, 71 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1968).
48 Id. at 939, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
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Neither the denial of the opportunity for advice of counsel before
stating whether one will submit to a test and before deciding which
test to take, nor the denial of the opportunity to have counsel
present while the test is administered, is the denial of any consti-
tutional right.49
The decision in United States v. Wade50 attempted to resolve the
issue of the critical stage when blood tests were involved. The Wade
court held:
[S]ystematized or scientific analyzing of the accused's fingerprints,
blood sample, clothing, hair, and the like [concern] differences
which preclude such stages being characterized as critical stages
at which the accused has the right to the presence of his counsel.
Knowledge of the techniques of science and technology is suffici-
ently available, and the variables in techniques few enough, that
the accused has the opportunity for a meaningful confrontation
of the Government's case at trial through the ordinary processes
of cross-examination of the Government's expert witnesses and
the presentation of the evidence of his own experts. The denial of
a right to have his counsel present at such analyses does not there-
fore violate the Sixth Amendment; they are not critical stages
since there is minimal risk that his counsel's absence at such stages
might derogate from his right to a fair trial.51
Pickard's basic premise, that a critical stage is involved, cannot
be reconciled with the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Wade. Therefore, Pickard rejects by implication the idea present
in Wade that a defendant has an opportunity throughout the "ordi-
nary processes of cross-examination" to determine the accuracy of
the test and veracity and credibility of expert witnesses.
V. THE CONFUSION CAUSED BY MIRANDA WARNINGS
In Pickard the arresting officer read to the accused a prepared
statement explaining the application of the implied consent law.
In addition, the officer read to the accused: "You are hereby advised
that you have the right to an attorney and if you desire you may
call one now."52 While the effect of this statement did not become
significant in Pickard, similar statements have presented problems
in other jurisdictions.
This type of perfunctory recital of Miranda warnings, without
further explanation, may mislead one accused of driving while
under the influence to believe that he has the immediate right to
counsel. Therefore, it is recommended that the arresting officer has
49 Id.
50 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
51 Id. at 227-28.
52 184 Neb. 573, 575, 169 N.W.2d 460, 461 (1969).
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the duty, as a manner of course, to advise the accused that his right
to counsel does not apply to choosing whether to submit to a blood
test.
When the arresting officer advises an accused of certain consti-
tutional rights and then refuses to allow the accused to exercise
those rights, this can only have a bewildering effect. In Reirdon v.
Director of Department of Motor Vehices,5 8 the accused was ar-
rested for driving while under the influence. Enroute to jail the
arresting officer informed the accused that he would have to submit
to a chemical test. After arriving at the police station Rierdon was
permitted to telephone his lawyer. Subsequent to his telephone
conversation the accused refused to take a blood test until his
lawyer was present. The appellant's conditional refusal resulted in
revocation of his drivers license by the Director of Motor Vehicles.
Before the court of appeals the appellant contended, inter alia, that
"he did not effectively refuse the administration of a chemical test
inasmuch as he was confused by the Miranda advice given by the
arresting officers." 54 However, the court did not accept the appel-
lant's allegation of misorientation and confusion, and held:
[T]he record indicates the arresting officer fully explained to peti-
tioner that he only had the right to counsel in connection with the
criminal charge of driving a motor vehicle under the influence of
intoxicating liquor.... Consequently, petitioner was not justified
in refusing to tate the test until an attorney was present inasmuch
as he was clearly and unequivocally told that he had no right to
the presence of counsel at the time the test was being admin-
istered.55
In later cases the court determined the Miranda warnings were
not clearly and unequivocally explained to one accused of driving
while under the influence. In Wethern v. Orr 6 the accused was
arrested for driving under the influence and was informed that he
had a right to counsel. In response to the Miranda warnings the
accused requested the assistance of counsel. Later at the police
station the arresting officer read to the accused a statement involv-
ing the implied consent law which was followed by a request that
the accused submit to a chemical test. In response the accused
renewed his original request for presence of counsel. Subsequently,
the Director of Motor Vehicles revoked the appellant's drivers li-
cense for refusal to submit to the chemical test. It was relevant to
the court that at no time was the accused informed that his consti-
tutional rights did not apply to the taking or choosing of a chemical
53 266 Cal. App. 2d 808, 72 Cal Rptr. 614 (1968).
54 Id. at 810, 72 Cal Rptr. at 615 (emphasis added).
55 Id. at 811, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 616 (emphasis added).
6 271 A.C.A. 925, 76 Cal. Rptr. 807 (1969).
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test. The court made it clear that earlier decisions which denied
the right to counsel in these circumstances were not being relaxed.
However, recognition was given to the possible confusion concern-
ing the Miranda warnings. To prevent a recurrence of the situa-
tion present in Wethern the court held that in the future:
The arrested person should be told the constitutional rights pre-
viously explained to him are not applicable to the decision he must
make concerning the three chemical tests, and he has no right to
consult an attorney before making the decision that he will, or will
not, submit to one of them .... To the extent that explanation
failed to point out the inapplicability of those rights to the decision
to, or not to, submit to a chemical test ... it was erroneous and
misleading.57
In Kingston v. Department of Motor Vehicles,55 a California
court of appeals was again faced with a case involving alleged con-
fusion brought about by a perfunctory recital of Miranda warnings.
In Kingston the arresting officer recited the Miranda warnings to
the accused at the time of arrest without any apparent explanation
as to its limitations. Later at the hospital the accused was requested
to submit to a blood test, to which he replied he wanted to see his
attorney. At his trial it was conceded by the arresting officer that
he informed the accused he had the right to talk to a lawyer and
have him present with him while he was being questioned. Further-
more, on cross-examination the officer admitted the only response
received from the appellant at the hospital was that he wanted to
see his attorney. Additional testimony showed the officer inter-
preted this response as an outright refusal. The court, in holding the
issue of refusal should not have been decided as a matter of law,
stated:
[I]t is conceivable that appellant,... misinterpreted the Miranda
warning. If so, he was entitled to further elaboration by the officer
before his request to 'see his attorney' was treated as an outright
refusal to take the test... [A]ppellant was at least entitled to a
hearing on the question as to whether he misinterpreted the
Miranda warning, and the court erred when it denied his petition
'out of hand.'59
Since Pickard's exception to the rule that disallows counsel to
those accused of driving under the influence involves a small mi-
nority of drivers, a means should be developed to protect the ma-
jority of drivers from unnecessary confusion. Furthermore, the
problem caused by Miranda warnings is more complicated in Ne-
braska because the arresting officer has to ascertain whether there
57 Id. at - - -, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 808.
Ss 271 A.C.A. 622, 76 Cal. Rptr. 614 (1969).
59 Id. at - - -, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 617.
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exists an appropriate factual context before clarifying the applic-
ability of these warnings. The California courts have established a
general rule requiring an unequivocal and clear explanation of the
Miranda warnings to one accused of driving under the influence
to prevent potential confusion. However, in Nebraska under Pickard
it will be difficult to repair the confusion that could arise from unex-
plained Miranda warnings.
VI. CONCLUSION
The dictum put forth in Pickard may prove to be the spring
board for further expansion of constitutional rights to those accused
of driving while under the influence. However, the decision has cast
doubt on the validity of earlier decisions which have given a rather
restrictive interpretation to the rights possessed by one accused of
driving under the influence. Additional decisions will be required
to reconcile the inconsistency between the rationale and the policy
enunciated in Prucha, Ziemba, Amick and similar cases.
The court's attempt to find a middle ground between the ex-
tremes represented by New York on the one hand and other juris-
dictions with implied consent laws such as California on the other
has introduced unwarranted confusion into the arrest process. The
determination of whether a felony has been committed may be
impossible in some cases, for example, where the accused has been
convicted twice.
Pickard has reopened the confusion existing between the power
and authority of the criminal versus civil proceedings. Logically,
the court in Pickard should have applied the waiver principle
developed in Prucha which was used to reject a contention based
on the fifth amendment. Since it did not, it has committed itself to
an inconsistent application of the waiver principle which depends
on the particular constitutional right alleged.
Pickard cannot be reconciled with the holding in United States
v. Wade, which states that taking a blood sample was not a critical
stage. There appears to be basic disagreement between the Cali-
fornia interpretation of Wade and the Nebraska interpretation.
The issue of reciting Miranda warnings without further explana-
tion was not decided by Pickard. However, it is submitted that con-
fusion under the Pickard rule will also prevent clear and unequi-
vocal interpretations by the arresting officer as to the use of Mi-
randa warnings.
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It is recommended that the Nebraska Supreme Court reconsider
the effects of this dictum on the policy underlying the implied con-
sent law and reject the dictum as inconsistent. The Pickard ap-
proach could be replaced by the New York approach which permits
all those accused of driving under the influence access to a lawyer.
Conversely, the court can follow the leading cases in California,
Iowa, South Dakota, Virginia and Maine60 which have denied the
right to counsel at this stage without exception.
George B. Klippert '71
60 State v. Stevens, 252 A.2d 58 (Me. 1969). The Stevens case involved
an appeal from a criminal conviction for drunk driving. After Stevens
was placed under arrest he was informed of his constitutional right
to remain silent and to assistance of counsel. The accused requested
counsel to be present. He was then permitted to telephone a lawyer,
but his attempt to reach his lawyer was unsuccessful. Thereafter,
Stevens agreed to submit to a blood test and the results of the
test were later introduced into evidence at his trial. Stevens contended
that both his constitutional right to counsel and the privilege against
self-incrimination were violated. These contentions were dismissed
by the court as having no merit, based upon the holding in Schmerber.
In respect to the right to counsel issue the court held: "Since petitioner
was not entitled to assert the privilege, he has no greater right because
counsel erroneously advised him that he could assert it. His claim
is strictly limited to the failure of the police to respect his wish,
reinforced by counsel's advice, to be left inviolate." Id. at 60 (quoting
Schmerber).
